Archive for the ‘model checking’ Category

Pre-data insights update priors via Bayes’s theorem

1 September 2018 Leave a comment

An idealized Cromwell’s principle

1 June 2018 Leave a comment

Cromwell’s principle idealized under the theory of large deviations

Seminar, Statistics and Probability Research Group, University of Ottawa

Ottawa, Ontario

April 27, 2018

David R. Bickel

University of Ottawa

Abstract. Cromwell’s principle requires that the prior probability that one’s assumptions are incorrect is greater than 0. That is relevant to Bayesian model checking since diagnostics often reveal that prior distributions require revision, which would be impossible under Bayes’s theorem if those priors were 100% probable. The idealized Cromwell’s principle makes the probability of making incorrect assumptions arbitrarily small. Enforcing that principle under large deviations theory leads to revising Bayesian models by maximum entropy in wide generality.

How to make decisions using somewhat reliable posterior distributions

15 January 2018 Leave a comment
Categories: model checking, preprints

Do models have probabilities or just possibilities?

15 January 2018 Leave a comment

Andrew says: David:I don’t think it makes sense to talk of the probability of a model. See this paper with Shalizi for much discussion of this point.

David Bickel says: If models do not have probabilities, perhaps they have possibilities in the sense of possibility theory. For example, the possibility of a model might be a function of its adequacy according to a model checking procedure: Appendix B of

Source: Not everyone’s aware of falsificationist Bayes – Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science

Inference after eliminating Bayesian models of excessive codelength

1 November 2017 Leave a comment

“The maximum-entropy and minimax redundancy distribution classes of sufficiently small codelength”

10th Workshop on Information Theoretic Methods in Science and Engineering

Paris, France

September 11, 2017

David R. Bickel

University of Ottawa

“Can You Change Your Bayesian Prior?”

1 July 2017 Leave a comment
DGM: “Is it legitimate to change one’s prior based on the data?”
Sometimes. A subjective Bayesian encountering completely unexpected data changes the prior:
In the philosophy literature, that has been compared to changing the premises of a deductive argument. It has been argued that just as one may revise a premise without abandoning deductive logic as a tool, one may revise a prior without abandoning Bayesian updating as a tool.
Categories: Fragments, model checking

Coherent inference after checking a prior

7 January 2016 Leave a comment