Archive for the ‘Fragments’ Category

“Tips for presenting at a scientific conference”

1 February 2019 Leave a comment

Introduction I served as a judge for some of the student presentations at the 2016 Canadian Statistics Student Conference (CSSC).  The conference was both a learning opportunity and a networking op…

Source: Tips for presenting at a scientific conference | The Chemical Statistician

Categories: Fragments

“A Litany of Problems With p-values”

15 December 2018 Leave a comment

“The Fiducialist Papers” archived in favor of “sIBEe”

20 September 2018 Leave a comment
Categories: Fragments

Should the default significance level be changed from 0.05 to 0.005?

1 July 2018 Leave a comment

My comments in this discussion of “Redefine statistical significance”:

The call for smaller significance levels cannot be based only on mathematical arguments that p values tend to be much lower than posterior probabilities, as Andrew Gelman and Christian Robert pointed out in their comment (“Revised evidence for statistical standards”).

In the rejoinder, Valen Johnson made it clear that the call is also based on empirical findings of non-reproducible research results. How many of those findings are significant at the 0.005 level? Should meta-analysis have a less stringent standard?

“Irreplicable results can’t possibly add empirical clout to the mathematical argument unless it is already known or assumed to be caused by a given cut-off, and further, that lowering it would diminish those problems.”

The preprint cites empirical results to support its use of the 1:10 prior odds. If that is in fact a reliable estimate of the prior odds for the reference class of previous studies, then, in the absence of other relevant information, it would be reasonable to use as input for Bayes’s theorem.

John Byrd asks, “Is 1:10 replicable?” Is it important to ask whether a 1:1 prior odds can be rejected at the 0.005 significance level?


The Fiducialist Papers: Evidence and Likelihood

1 April 2018 Leave a comment
Categories: Fragments

Do models have probabilities or just possibilities?

15 January 2018 Leave a comment

Andrew says: David:I don’t think it makes sense to talk of the probability of a model. See this paper with Shalizi for much discussion of this point.

David Bickel says: If models do not have probabilities, perhaps they have possibilities in the sense of possibility theory. For example, the possibility of a model might be a function of its adequacy according to a model checking procedure: Appendix B of

Source: Not everyone’s aware of falsificationist Bayes – Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science

What’s the goal of statistics in scientific applications?

1 October 2017 Leave a comment

the goal [of statistical inference in science] is not to infer highly probable claims (in the formal sense)* but claims which have been highly probed and have passed severe probes

Source: Deborah G. Mayo’s Performance or Probativeness? E.S. Pearson’s Statistical Philosophy | Error Statistics Philosophy

Categories: Fragments

“a list of possibly predatory publishers” based on Beall’s List

1 September 2017 Leave a comment

This is a list of possibly predatory publishers. The kernel for this list was extracted from the archive of Beall’s List at It will be updated as new information or suggested edits are submitted or found by the maintainers of this site.

Source: List of Predatory Publishers | Stop Predatory Journals (accessed 24 August 2017)

Categories: Fragments

“Can You Change Your Bayesian Prior?”

1 July 2017 Leave a comment
DGM: “Is it legitimate to change one’s prior based on the data?”
Sometimes. A subjective Bayesian encountering completely unexpected data changes the prior:
In the philosophy literature, that has been compared to changing the premises of a deductive argument. It has been argued that just as one may revise a premise without abandoning deductive logic as a tool, one may revise a prior without abandoning Bayesian updating as a tool.
Categories: Fragments, model checking

SSC 2017 talk on the misleading nature of false discovery rates

13 June 2017 Leave a comment
Categories: Fragments